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ABSTRACT 
 
The focus of this paper is on the strategies applied by Singapore-Chinese 
businesses upon failing in their China business ventures. It has been 
argued that both the increase of Singapore ventures into China and the 
failures are due to either cultural issues (misinterpretation of ‘shared 
ethnicity’) or economic factors (differences in economic practices). 
Singapore businessmen apply inclusive strategies combining Western 
management styles with Chinese ways of doing business in order to reduce 
the risk involved with investments across national borders into China. 
Though largely successful, this strategy entails its own risks. Based on 10 
case studies, this paper discusses the ways in which Singapore Chinese 
entrepreneurs respond upon failing in China and the strategies they develop 
to re-find their comfort zone for transnational business ventures. 1
 
Keywords: Chineseness, Ethinicity, Entrepreneurship, Singapore, China, 
Business Strategies.
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 Introduction 
 
Doing business in China mainland is a popular topic in current 
management books and expat manuals boasting of tips and tricks in order 
to ensure successful business deals for businessmen who enter China with 
great hopes and expectations. This literature is produced particularly to 
guide Western businesspeople in their China adventure as it is implicitly or 
explicitly understood that Chinese business culture strongly contrasts with 
its Western counterpart. Inspired by Hofstede’s analysis of cultural 
differences (1995) it is claimed that Western capitalist market cultures 
characterized by individualism, rationality and secularism meet with 
collectivism, familism and Confucianism in China. The upsurge of foreign 
direct investment in China during the 1990s and the emergence of more 
and more Sino-foreign joint ventures have raised concerns about 
management, organizational culture and corporate identity. From a Western 
perspective, many publications testify to the different-ness of China and the 
Chinese in general and of doing business in China in particular (Wilpert and 
Scharpf 1990; Jia 1993; Bogstra et al 1993; Van Buuren et al 1995; 
Harmsen and Nelissen 1995; Weller 1998; Buckley 1999).  
 
However hard Western business people may try to acquire an 
understanding of cultural norms and values to be successful in China, the 
accumulation of social capital that provides access to Chinese bureaucratic 
power is difficult to accomplish without the relevant connections built on 
trust. The lesson learned by Western managers is that they have to dismiss 
the idea that trust has to be based on calculation of economic costs and 
benefits and on shared business strategies and management styles and 
that affection-based trust has to be rejected as ‘unprofessional’ and as 
characteristic of an era prior to the advent of capitalism and the modern 
nation state. It is claimed that in transnational business ventures an 
increase in networks can be witnessed, networks which are based on ethnic 
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 affinity (Koot, Leisink and Verweel 2003). In this respect it seems obvious 
that Westerners face a structural disadvantage vis-à-vis some of their Asian 
competitors when it comes to establish rapport with the Chinese. 
 
Conversely, management gurus like Kotkin (1993) have identified 
ethnic ties - allegedly more affection-based than other forms of social 
relations - as the success formula of Asian businesses. Ethnic Chinese 
businesses in particular, organised in ‘bamboo-networks’ (Weidenbaum and 
Hughes 1996), are regarded as the spearheads of Asia’s economic growth 
as well as a major global force. As the story goes, the large Chinese 
diaspora living in Southeast Asia and in ethnic Chinese communities 
scattered all over the world, enjoys special privileges when it comes to 
business ventures into China. After all, being descendents of Chinese 
migrants, they not only look Chinese, but they can also be expected to 
speak Mandarin or at least one of the many Chinese dialects, maintain 
connections with their ancestral village and be familiar with or at least 
sensitive to Chinese ways of doing business. Indeed, the image of the 
networking, family-based, flexible overseas Chinese business has become 
a trope in the literature on transnational relations in contemporary 
Southeast Asia (cf. Chan 2000; Coe, Kelly and Olds 2003; Douw 1999; 
Gomez and Hsiao 2001, 2004; Redding 1990; Suryadinata 1997; Yeung 
and Olds 2000) and beyond (cf. Ong 1999). Coupled with the capacity for 
hard work and trust based on blood ties or ritual kinship, Chinese business 
networks seem to distinguish Chinese capitalism and seem to have 
engendered the economic success of the overseas Chinese where others 
failed (Redding 1990).  
 
One of the ethnic Chinese communities that should prove this point 
is the city-state of Singapore, the only place outside of Greater China where 
the Chinese constitute the majority of the population. In the late 1980s, with 
China re-entering the world economy and Singapore craving for new 
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 markets to overcome economic recession, the Singapore government was 
among the first to invest in China. Since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Singapore and China in 1990, there has been a rapid 
increase in the number of Singaporeans visiting China for the purposes of 
both ancestor worship and economic investments (Bolt 2000, Khun 1999, 
Tan 1996). Presently, Singapore is among the largest foreign investors in 
China, while China is among the most important countries for Singapore’s 
investments abroad (Bolt 2000, p. 135-136; Kumar, Siddique and Hedrick-
Wong 2005). 
 
However, there is also an increase in the number of business failures 
of which no records are kept. Many Singapore-Chinese businessmen – 
including the Singapore government as the largest entrepreneur in the city 
state - have learned the hard way that their China mainland counterparts 
not necessarily subscribe to the image of Singaporeans as fellow-Chinese 
and treat them as foreigners. Conversely, Hong Kong Chinese companies 
are rather successful in their China mainland ventures. Being pioneers in 
mainland investments when China opened its borders to foreign 
investments, Hong Kong entrepreneurs showed flexibility, patience, local 
sensitivity and long-term perspectives instead of a quest for quick profits in 
their business ventures. Although they had their share of failures in China, 
Hong Kong (and Macao) entrepreneurs had a competitive advantage over 
other investors from East and Southeast Asia as they were regarded not as 
“’foreigners’ but tong bao – compatriots – and could thus contribute to 
national modernization in a way that was less threatening than assistance 
from capitalists …”(Smart and Smart 2000, p. 261). Singaporeans, 
entertaining the idea of a shared ethnicity whereas being defined as both 
foreigners and capitalists in China mainland, obviously fell into the trap of 
regarding the Chinese as one homogeneous category. 
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 In this paper, Singaporean business failures in China will be 
investigated in terms of the consequences that Singaporean businessmen 
have drawn from their experience and the ways in which they respond to 
business failure. How do they cope with the discovery that their alleged 
cultural advantage vis-à-vis other investors in China – their self-declared 
dual identity between China and the West – turned out to be a 
misjudgement of how the Chinese conceived of them? In contrast to the 
recently published study by Kumar, Siddique and Hedrick-Wong (2005) 
which analyses the factors that contributed to the success of both large and 
small Singapore businesses in China and the lessons that these businesses 
put to use to improve their competitive position there, this paper focuses on 
small businesses that – upon suffering bankruptcy - pulled out of China. 
Based on a number of case studies, the focus is on the ways in which 
Singapore Chinese entrepreneurs re-defined and re-directed their business 
ventures after leaving China.  
 
This paper is structured as follows: Upon elaborating of the current 
theoretical debate addressing issues cultural versus capitalist motives of 
ethnic Chinese business ventures into China and a brief portrayal of the 
development of Singapore investments in China from the late 1980s, the 
paper proceeds with a brief description of the available database. In the 
following section, the empirical findings are presented, featuring a number 
of selected case studies. In the concluding section, some theoretical 
thoughts will be developed for further investigation.  
 
Ethnic Chinese Transborder Ventures: a Theoretical Perspective 
 
Chinese capitalism has been described in terms of a ‘network 
capitalism’ characterised by both hierarchical relationships within the family 
and a system of reciprocal relationships known as guanxi (good 
connections). Chinese business ventures consisting of independent firms 
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 loosely structured in multi-firm business groups (Hefner 1998) or ‘bamboo 
networks’ (Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996) have been traced to a 
Confucian value system that presumably emphasises trust and 
responsibilities towards the lineage (cf. Fukuyama 1995; Kotkin 1993, 
Redding 1990). It has been argued that this centrality of the family as a 
fundamental unit of social and economic organisation gives the ethnic 
Chinese their sense of Chineseness (cf. Yeung and Olds 2000). The central 
argument of this ‘culturalist’ approach is that institutions, norms and 
practices of ethnic Chinese businessmen have facilitated the growth of their 
enterprises and the emergence of ethnic business networks – extending 
into China mainland.  
 
It has, however, been questioned whether many ethnic 
Chinese businessmen from Southeast Asia share a bond 
based on a common ethnic identity in general and with the 
Chinese in China in particular. The homogenizing assumptions 
of the culturalist approach ignore the experiences of Chinese 
communities and individual Chinese entrepreneurs under 
specific and widely differing economic and political conditions. 
The approach that stresses ‘profit seeking’ as a main motive 
for transnational ventures focuses on how global and local 
economic organization represents the Chinese with 
opportunities (Gomez 1999; Jesudason 1989; Thireau and 
Hua 1999). Mutual interest instead of common ethnic identity 
seems to characterize successful cooperative efforts among 
Chinese businesses across national borders (Hodder 1996; 
Godley 1999).  
 
In this ‘culture versus capitalism’ debate the impact of political power 
on economic actors is lacking. A political economy perspective focuses on 
culture as an instrument for the protection of material and political interests 
(Gomez 2002; Gomez and Hsiao 2004). This approach contests essentialist 
arguments that culture, shared identities and value systems determine 
ethnic business activity. Culture and ethnicity are social phenomena that 
can be manipulated by governments, businessmen and community 
organisations in the pursuit of their own goals. In present-day Asia, states 
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 are directly involved in economic decisions taken by private entrepreneurs 
in their country. They do not shy away from far-going interventions like 
forced savings, tax policies to attract (foreign) investments, restricting 
capital outflow, and repressing interest rates and by so doing, shaping 
financial market activity, providing logistics infrastructure and targeting 
service-rich sophisticated manufacturing strongly influences the pattern of 
service sector location and growth (O’Connor and Hutton 1998). Singapore, 
in particular, is described as a ‘developmental’ state as the government 
itself ventured into profit oriented projects acting as the city state’s main 
economic agent for a number of decades. A developmental state, according 
to Leftwich, can be defined as a state “whose politics have concentrated 
sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and 
encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives …” (1995, 
p. 400). Under these conditions, government patronage is of great 
importance for domestic entrepreneurs whose economic success is closely 
intertwined with state-orchestrated privileges allocated to specific (ethnic) 
groups.  
 
The three different perspectives are brought together in Hamilton’s 
institutional approach which claims that the organisation of business firms is 
largely shaped by institutional structures, business networks being the most 
characteristic example (Hamilton 1996, 2000). Business networks are 
useful institutional means of implementing co-operative strategies and 
enhancing “institutional thickness” (Amin and Thrift as cited by Yeung and 
Olds 2000, p. 15) in any business system. In the context of Chinese 
business networks, ‘institutional thickness’ can be generally represented by 
the strong cultural and social embedded-ness of business networks in 
personal relationships (guanxi), high levels of personal and social 
interaction among actors in these networks, collective representation 
through trade and commercial associations and informal business 
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 groupings, state patronage and the quest for mutual benefits (Yeung and 
Olds 2000, p. 15-16).  
 
Chinese family firms may still play an important role in the business 
networks as providers of resources, such as the capital for business start-
ups, hands-on training and good connections. While Chinese families may 
have lost their position of overall capital provider to institutes of formal 
education providing professional training and to governments intervening in 
markets and controlling economic assets, they have also become part of 
larger networks of loosely connected sets of firms (Numazaki, 2000, p. 172). 
Therefore, the role of inter- and intra-family linkages as providers of social 
capital must not be underestimated – whether based on affective ties or 
mutual benefit.  While maintaining the inclusive perspective of the 
institutional approach, Ng (2002) argues in favour of a historical viewpoint 
on capital assets of the ethnic Chinese. He identifies a shift from family and 
ethnic linkages in the pre-independence period to more profit-oriented 
assets and, finally, state-sponsored benefits for Singaporean businessmen 
venturing abroad. Considering this generational shift, one may wonder 
whether the young generation of entrepreneurs also draws on the traditional 
ethnic-based ties that characterize the investment patterns favoured by the 
older generations and leverage these into a new form of social capital as a 
distinct source of competitive advantage. 
 
Literature addressing (ethnic) Chinese business ventures 
emphasizes the significance of social capital in cooperation and coalition 
building. This applies in particular to small and medium enterprises that 
regard flexible and informal networking as normal business practice. 
“Chinese business tends to be conducted through a series of personalized 
networks based on friendship and trust which are given substance by long 
term relationships and reputation of trustworthiness and reliability, rather 
than in the open marketplace or in an institutional framework”(Tracy and 
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 Lever-Tracy 2002, p. 72). Ethnic Chinese businessmen accumulate social 
capital by maintaining membership in a number of partly overlapping 
networks. “There is not one Chinese diaspora network but many, based 
initially on things like language groups, clan associations or place of origin, 
or alternatively on old school or university friends, but given substance over 
time by business association. Business people are often members of more 
than one network and can pass members from one network to another… 
The strength of these networks is also their capacity for extension to new 
members in new places” (ibid; cf. also Tan and Yeung 2000, p. 240). This 
strategy of networking enables (ethnic) Chinese businessmen to evade 
failing vertical linkages, such as bureaucratic obstacles, by forming 
horizontal coalitions based on guanxi relationships. Guanxi-based personal 
trust is an expansive and inclusive principle providing the ‘institutional 
thickness’ that characterizes (ethnic) Chinese business networks in a 
globalizing business environment (Chan and Tong 2000, p. 74). This 
perspective provides a framework for the analysis of the practices applied 
by Singapore-Chinese businessmen venturing into China mainland markets 
and their failure.  
 
Singapore business in China mainland 
 
Upon the establishment of diplomatic relations between Singapore 
and China in 1990, there has been a rapid increase in capital investments in 
China; Singapore being among the largest investors. In China, the 
economic reform and modernization programme since 1979, including the 
designation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and “open cities” in the 
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, attracted Chinese overseas investors 
who had their ancestral roots there (Tan and Yeung 2000). Before 1994, 
over 80 percent of all Singaporean investment projects were situated in the 
provinces of Guandong and Fujian, where most Chinese Singaporeans 
originated. These investment projects were initiated primarily by private 
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 Singaporean companies and were relatively small-scale (Chan and Tong 
2000:72). Since the mid-1990s, ventures into China were organized by the 
Singapore government which led consortia of government-led companies 
(GLCs) and local companies further north to Wuxi, Suzhou, and other 
places in Zhejiang, Henan and Sichuan provinces (Chan 2000; Tan 1996). 
These missions included small- and medium-scale enterprises as part of 
the government schemes promoting this sector and creating an ‘external 
wing’ of the Singapore economy (Ng 2002, p. 262). More recently, the 
expansion of investments by GLCs has been to more peripheral areas in 
China. They are moving away from the older SEZs and into newer areas 
such as Yunnan and Sichuan, as the less developed inland provinces offer 
attractive concessions (Chan and Tong 2000). However, Singaporean 
private firms, both large and small prefer to concentrate their investments in 
the coastal areas rather than in China’s interior (Bolt 2000, p. 139).  
 
The type and scale of investments have also changed. In the initial 
period, funds were directed primarily towards real estate development, food 
processing and manufacturing. These traditional investment sectors are still 
popular among smaller enterprises (Bolt 2000, p. 138). The services sector 
has become a new and rather diversified area for investment among large 
private and public enterprises targeting leisure and recreation, the tourism 
industry, environmental protection, warehousing, finance, logistics, 
communications and information technology. Singaporean GLCs in joint 
ventures with third-country firms or Chinese state investment agencies are 
involved in massive projects, such as the development of ports, industrial 
parks and infrastructural projects that require huge injections of capital 
(Chan and Tong 2000). While for the latter investments the concept of 
political entrepreneurship has been coined to describe the role of the 
Singapore government as being one of the most important institutional 
forces behind Singapore investments in China (Tan and Yeung 2000, p. 
239), small Singapore companies benefited from family relationships that 
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 had been maintained through a long period of political hostility between 
China and Singapore. Once the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries relaxed travel restrictions, increasing numbers of 
Singaporeans have returned for purposes of ancestor worship as well as 
economic investments that contributed needed developmental capital (Khun 
1999, p. 143). Besides for capitalist considerations - the promise of quick 
and large profits-, affinity with the village where one’s family originated from 
and a shared ‘Chinese’ identity contributed to the interest taken by ethnic 
Chinese businessmen to invest in China (Douw 1999). In addition to being a 
strategy of overcoming economic recession and counteracting political 
insecurity in Southeast Asia, Singapore’s China policy must also be 
regarded as a balancing act to establish an identity of its own juggling with 
often conflicting forces of  Westernization (holding the promise of economic 
prosperity) and Sinification (holding the promise of cultural authenticity). 
Singapore-Chinese businessmen seem to benefit from their dual identity as 
they can exploit the ethnic advantage by strategically playing up their 
Chinese identity when dealing with business people in China mainland. At 
the same time, their being different is what makes them attractive business 
partners for the Chinese, as they represent the successful Asian model of 
modernisation without westernisation (Chan and Tong 2000) – at least, this 
is what the Singaporean corporate sector, the government and a few 
political analysts thought. 
 
Investments in China mainland by large and small businesses 
certainly generated considerable returns for Singapore entrepreneurs and 
the city-state at large (cf. Kumar, Siddique and Hedrick-Wong 2005), but it 
also came with certain risks and failed to yield the huge profits that many 
Singaporean entrepreneurs had dreamt of when setting out to enter this 
country. The most infamous example of a business failure is provided by 
the Singapore government with its much publicized Suzhou project. This 
project aimed at the development of a 70-square-kilometre industrial 
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 township in Suzhou, dubbed as ‘Singapore II’ (Bolt 2000, p. 139). This 
project which started in 1993 received government support at both 
provincial and national levels. It was agreed and signed by the national 
governments of Singapore and China to transfer knowledge in economic 
management and public administration from Singapore to China, granting 
Singapore a 65 per cent stake in this project. The total investments in this 
project were estimated to reach US$ 30 billion (Bolt 2000, p. 140). In 1997 
the project which had already attracted private investors from Western and 
Asian countries, ran into problems which were caused by conflicts between 
the joint Chinese-Singaporean management and by competition from a rival 
industrial park established by the Suzhou government adjacent to the 
Singaporean venture. When in 2001 the Singapore government handed 
over management of the industrial park to the Chinese, its loss on this 
project was estimated at about US$ 90 million (Bolt 2000, p. 140-141). 
 
The Database 
 
Underlying this paper is a database of 56 in-depth case-studies of 
Singaporean small- and medium sized companies in the manufacturing (26), 
retail (12) and services sectors (18). The vast majority of these companies 
(46) are owned and managed by ethnic Chinese people. The case studies 
were established with the purpose of gaining insight into intra- and inter-
ethnic relations in their cross-border business ventures, whether long-
standing or recently established, of which 23 (46%) include investments in 
China mainland. Of these 23 companies 10 discussed their business failures 
with the researchers. The involvement in cross-border exchanges of some 
kind formed a criterion of selection for companies to be eligible for this 
research.  
 
The research methods applied may be characterized in terms of 
organizational ethnography which refers to a way of doing fieldwork. 
Fieldwork is a long-term involvement with the people under study with the 
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 aim of obtaining an in-depth understanding of the ways in which they 
construct their world and give meaning to their lives. The case-studies 
established in Singapore, however, often encountered the problem that the 
researcher was denied long-term participation in everyday organizational 
practice and, as a consequence, failed to reach beyond the public face and 
front-stage behavior that organizational members perform in front of 
outsiders. In these cases, the researcher refrained herself with obtaining 
ethno-data, i.e. answers to open interview questions (Dahles 2006). Only a 
few case-studies represent an in-depth ethnographic description compiled 
from a number of lengthy conversations with the manager-owners in their 
‘natural habitat’ and with people from their private and business network – 
resulting in thick description (Geertz 1973) of what I prefer to term his 
‘business-life-history’. This is a biographical method which focuses on the 
chronology of critical events and decisions in the life of an entrepreneur that 
describe his or her career as businessman or –woman. In a context where 
firms are unstable, business start-ups quickly end in bankruptcy and 
mergers and acquisitions are pertinent – as is the case of many Singapore 
small and mdium-sized enterprises (SMEs) - an ethnographic-historical 
approach focusing on organizations as basic units of research would be an 
unrewarding venture. The purpose of these ethnographic case studies I 
collected was to obtain an in-depth understanding of the ways in which 
Singaporean entrepreneurs establish business coalitions with foreign 
companies within and across Singaporean borders and how these 
coalitions are intertwined with the politics of identity characteristic of the 
intra- and inter-state relations in East and Southeast Asia. In the next 
section, the findings from both approaches – single-interview cases and 
business-life-histories will be presented.   
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 Coping with failure - learning from failure?  
 
In this section, Singapore business ventures into China mainland will 
be discussed in terms of the strategies applied by the owners/managers to 
start and maintain their enterprise in China ... The use of personal 
resources such as family ties and diverse forms of ethnic affiliation 
(expressed through lineage, dialect group, hometown associations, etc.) 
range among ‘conventional’ strategies applied by of ethnic Chinese 
businessmen (Dahles 2002; 2004; 2005). The use of conventional 
strategies in China ventures reflects a rather conservative and predictable 
way of doing business. Conversely, ‘new’ strategies in the Singaporean 
context are subcontracting and other cooperative relations with foreign 
multinational corporations (MNCs) and with foreign friends and 
acquaintances recruited through overseas academic education. The use of 
these personal assets reflects a rather diverse and dynamic way of doing 
business. Often, conventional and new strategies are combined together to 
be used selectively constituting a mixed strategy within a specific context. 
The analysis will identify differences in the ways in which Singaporean 
businessmen using conventional and new investment strategies respond to 
business failure in China. For each category, one exemplary case will be 
presented in ‘boxes’ to illustrate how this specific form of capital is exploited 
in business ventures.  
 
Conventional strategies  
 
Trading with China and, in particular, importing Chinese goods from 
and to one’s ancestral village, is conventional in the ‘traditional Chinese’ 
sense and characteristic of many first-generation ethnic Chinese firms in 
Singapore. Few of these first-generation Chinese are still at the helm of 
their companies; most of these firms have been taken over by the next 
generation(s) or have perished by lack of a successor. With the next 
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 generation in charge, the companies often undergo far-reaching 
adjustments in terms of management styles, business practices and market 
orientation. Also, the products of these firms diversify. First-generation 
ethnic Chinese were looking for markets to buy traditional Chinese products 
for import to Singapore, where these products were then traded in the local 
market with a substantial demand for authentic Chinese consumer goods. 
The second generation is more inclined to look for markets in China to sell 
their products from Singapore while, at the same time, they both diversify 
and expand their business beyond both China and Singapore. When asked 
about the reasons for venturing into China mainland, this category of small 
and medium-scale entrepreneurs produced answers that showed a mix of 
calculation and sentiment. The majority referred to the economic 
opportunities that this huge country seemed to offer, but they also 
mentioned the advantages of having relatives in China, speaking the 
language and their familiarity with and the pleasure taken in ‘Chinese ways 
of doing business’. One informant explicitly brought up the informal 
atmosphere and the considerable amount of time invested in socializing 
with his mainland business partners that in his view contrasted pleasantly 
with the ‘no-nonsense, black-and-white’ approach to business that 
characterized the ‘Singapore way’.  
 
The entrepreneurs in this category who experienced business failure, 
pulled out of China never to return, but they did not lose faith in the basic 
strategy they used to employ to establish cross-border business coalitions, 
i.e. the strategy of building on family and ethnic relations. According to 
Linda Wang, managing director of B&Office, a stationary supplier, there is 
no trust between Singapore and Chinese businesses: “Better concentrate 
on Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand” (interview 2003). As Case 1 below 
illustrates, it is in these kinds of relations that sentiments and emotions are 
invested, irrelevant of where kin and co-ethnics are located. The betrayal by 
distant kin in China is blamed on the weakness of these blood-ties, not on 
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 the failure of kin and ethnic group as providers of trust. Hence, instead of 
persuading business people to shift their cross-border business strategies 
from kin/ethnic based to ‘rationalist’ approaches, kin and ethnic group 
become even more important for doing business. The shift is from defining 
one’s identity as rooted in mainland China (before it turned communist), to 
locating one’s roots in colonial Southeast Asia under British rule. 
 
Case 1: Failure of conventional assets  
Principal Refrigerating & Airconditioning1
… was established in 1965 by the brother of its present owner as a 
trading firm in household items. The business changed into a successful 
exporting firm in refrigeration spare parts. Principal R&A is a family 
business owned by Mr. Luh, a Singaporean Chinese, and managed by his 
Malaysian Chinese wife. The firm is embedded in the Luh’s extended 
family network; forty members of which are involved in the business as 
branch manager, staff or associate. Principal R&A has Singapore as its 
home base and offices in Kuala Lumpur and Johore Bahru (Malaysia). 
These offices are managed by Mrs. Luh’s brothers. Principal R&A was 
one of the first small entrepreneurs from Singapore to enter China as 
early as 1988. The Luh couple established business links with distant kin 
in Hong Kong who ran a few companies across the border. The Luhs 
entrusted them with the capital to start trade offices in China mainland. 
The Hong Kong relatives took the money to China but invested it in their 
own mainland manufacturing businesses that suffered bankruptcy. After 
this failure, the Luhs decided to play it safe. They consolidated their 
Singapore business and started to expand their Malaysian branch offices 
through Mrs. Luh’s close kin. “One has to be careful doing business in 
China”, says Mrs. Luh, “in Malaysia with close relatives, we don’t expect 
bad surprises”. Although Mrs. Luh is aware of the different position of the 
ethnic Chinese in both countries, she denies that there are any cultural 
differences among the Singaporean and Malaysian Chinese. After all, she 
remarked, “Malaysia and Singapore used to be a British colony”. 
(interview 2002). 
 
New strategies  
 
For decades, the Singapore government invited foreign multinational 
corporations to invest and locate their regional head-offices in Singapore. 
When the government started to promote the establishment of an ‘external 
wing’ of the Singapore economy, these MNCs obtained the role of 
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 intermediary for introducing Singaporean entrepreneurs to foreign markets. 
The preferred position of Singapore businessmen as subcontractors of 
foreign multinational corporations provided crucial assets to venture beyond 
Singapore. Basically, it was a risk-avoiding strategy that allowed small 
companies to ride the waves of the expansion drift of their main clients 
benefiting from their local knowledge, their networks and contacts with the 
foreign state agencies. Recently, Singapore Chinese companies working for 
large Japanese or Western MNCs were more or less forced to do business 
across the border when their clients decided to cut costs by outsourcing or 
relocating some of their production units in low-payment countries in the 
region. There are also examples of companies that emerged after their 
owners (former MNC-employees or subcontractors) were introduced to 
foreign markets by their former employers or clients. However, even at 
present, most Singaporean graduates prefer to start their career in a foreign 
MNC in order to gain experience in business practices and learn a trade. 
Subsequently, they start their own businesses as a subcontractor of their 
former employer. Sometimes, they shift back and forth between being 
employed and starting a new business several times and finally, if market 
forces work in their favour, they expand their businesses across the border.  
 
Another business strategy that observes risk-avoidance when 
venturing into China is the participation in government missions. This 
strategy emerged with the political entrepreneurship of the Singapore 
developmental state and has been most prominent in traditional service 
sectors such as construction and transportation, distribution, and 
warehousing. Entrepreneurs in these sectors benefited from the large-scale 
public projects initiated by government agencies like the Port of Singapore 
Authority, the Mass Rapid Transport Corporation, and the Housing 
Development Board (HDB). Later on, other economic sectors, such as 
computer hardware and software, business services, and biotechnology, 
also became important for government-initiated projects. Having 
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 established a good reputation in government circles, these entrepreneurs 
were invited by state agencies to join government missions abroad. These 
patterns can also be discerned among Singaporean SMEs venturing into 
China, as Case 2 below illustrates. 
 
Case 2: New strategies: dragging business ventures    
Green Apple IT Solutions 
Henry Chan Hock Seng, the owner and at the same time manager of 
Green Apple IT Solutions, a dotcom firm situated in Singapore’s China 
town, was born in 1965 as the second child and only son of a 
Singaporean Chinese real estate agent. Henry obtained an engineering 
degree from Nanyang Polytechnic in 1990 and an MBA diploma from a 
polytechnic-turned-university in Perth (Australia) two years later. His 
business start-up in Singapore in the information technology sector failed 
due to the Asian Crisis. Only two years later, ambitions were soaring 
again as Singaporean enterprises were lured into entering the global 
market by its entrepreneurial government. In 1999, Henry was invited to 
join a government-sponsored trade mission to China which he owed to his 
father’s connections with the HBD involved in industrial estate 
development in China. This mission resulted in Henry’s involvement in a 
few projects – not for the Singapore government but for foreign 
Singapore-based multinational corporations in China mainland. With his 
name on the list of participants of the HDB mission, foreign and domestic 
firms with an interest in China investments approached him with job 
offers.  
 
Upon having established a network of potential clients, Henry opened a 
Shanghai branch of the Green Apple. At first, this branch was a one-man 
business. Eventually as the business ran well while the parent company 
in Singapore was suffering due to Henry’s frequent absence, he took on a 
few local ICT engineers to help him with the projects. His clients in China 
were domestic as well as foreign, private as well as state-owned 
enterprises requiring foreign expertise in establishing computer networks 
and appropriate software. In 2004, while the Green Apple had been taken 
over by another Singaporean IT firm, its Shanghai branch had split off 
from the Singaporean parent company and then joined forces with a local 
IT firm. This joint venture did reasonably well, but cooperation between 
Singaporean and managers from China mainland did not run smoothly. 
The biggest bone of contention between both partners was the 
‘overhead’, as Henry euphemistically labelled the bribes that Henry 
refused to pay. As his Shanghai counterpart was better equipped to deal 
with the Chinese government and the Chinese market, Henry became 
more of a silent partner leaving most of the management to his local 
counterpart.  
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At the same time, a new business start-up planned in Beijing did not 
materialize. After four years, Henry’s Beijing venture still had not been 
approved by the Chinese authorities. Henry felt bitter about Chinese 
bureaucracy which he characterised as hostile and corrupt. While this 
Beijing venture was still pending, Henry lost interest in China. A new 
international joint venture in Kuala Lumpur with former college friends 
from Australia opened exciting new avenues to the European and 
American markets. [fieldnotes August 2000 and May 2004] 
 
In the personal network of young entrepreneurs in Singapore 
connections established during their education abroad (which implies that 
they are English educated), with former employers and colleagues, and 
professional associations (in contrast to traditional Chinese hometown 
associations) play a rather prominent role. These connections directly or 
indirectly provide a vehicle for launching business across the border into 
Southeast Asian, China and the Asia-Pacific, often with the ultimate aim to 
start a successful venture in the United States. Henry Chan, who is 
introduced in Case 2, provides a good example of this shift from 
conventional to new strategies in business ventures. In 2003, his first firm 
‘Green Apple IT Solutions’, which he had started with financial injections 
provided by his father, ceased to exist as an independent company in 
Singapore. It was taken over by a larger domestic IT company. Henry Chan 
did not this resist this takeover as he preferred to put his energy into his 
Shanghai venture. However, something even more exciting came up. In 
2004, Henry was in a joint venture with Australian and Chinese Malaysian 
university friends operating a dotcom firm in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia). The 
joint venture which combined Malaysian local knowledge, Singaporean 
experience in the new technology sector and Australian marketing skills 
targeted the multimedia super-corridor in Klang Valley, the Silicon Valley of 
Malaysia. Henry invested most of his time in this new business venture 
which – as he expected - would soon expand to Europe and the United 
States. For this purpose and for enhancing competitiveness they attempted 
to acquire international certification for their products and services. All in all, 
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 this Western-Asian joint venture is an exemplary case of the increasing 
cosmopolitan outlook and professionalization of small and medium 
entrepreneurs which significantly enhances their social capital.  
 
 
Relocating the comfort zone: an analysis 
 
Singaporean SMEs may enter China in the slipstream of 
government-sponsored trade missions or relocation of their main clients, 
and may subsequently learn to benefit from the attractive production factors 
in China and its huge market, as the following Case 3 will illustrate. 
 
Case 3: The success story 
Com-Elect Special Products  
This company was established in 1990 with a total of 3 staff members 
including the founder/owner/manager. The firm operated with contracts 
for manufacturing components such as semiconductors, metal finishings 
and circuit boards for large multinational corporations in the electronics 
sector, among which were Philips, AMD and Hitachi. The company did 
well and employed 20 people in 1995. Upon obtaining ISO certification, 
Com-Elect entered into a process of expansion and restructuring. 
Permanent sales offices were established in Malaysia, Thailand, the 
Philippines and Indonesia. The staff of these offices, consisting of sales 
representatives and technical personnel, were trained in Singapore and 
came back regularly for audits. In Singapore, in addition to the 
manufacturing, quality control and marketing divisions, a R&D team was 
set up in 2000 which consisted of engineers from Singapore, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong and China. An employment agent was entrusted with the 
recruitment of these highly trained and specialised experts, all of whom 
were (ethnic) Chinese. Mr. Tang, the owner-manager of Com-Elect 
remarked that (ethnic) Chinese employees are hard-working and stress-
proof people who share the same culture.  
 
In 2002 the company – counting 40 employees - shifted production to 
Suzhou in China. The Suzhou plant was a greenfield investment and did 
not involve local partners. Manpower was relocated from Singapore to 
China to start operations. Processes of economic restructuring in 
Singapore and market shifts in the region, in particular the relocation of 
production by its major clients, provided the immediate trigger for Com-
Elect to move to China. Eventually, the Singaporean employees were 
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 substituted by Chinese workers to cut production costs. The parent 
company in Singapore developed from a manufacturing company into a 
producer service much in line with the government policy of turning the 
city-state into the regional total business hub. 
[Interview 2002] 
 
 
Cultural affinity may stimulate investments, but capitalist 
considerations certainly constitute the major reason for the ‘new’ 
businessmen to venture into China. Instead of diasporic affiliation with the 
(imagined) homeland, Chinese efficiency, resourcefulness and respect 
towards Singaporeans play a decisive role for businessmen from the city-
state to seek cooperation with mainland Chinese partners. “The Chinese 
have a mechanically efficient mind,” said one of our informants. “They have 
four seasons and always have to think one year ahead,” added another 
Singaporean entrepreneur. “China realises that there are things we can 
learn from each other and that we can be equal partners. It’s not about who 
is more superior, it’s about business…” commented a third informant. So 
much for the success stories; what about business failures?  
 
With tales of bankruptcies in China flooding into Singapore business 
life and with even GLCs failing, many Singapore Chinese SMEs shy away 
from investments in China mainland. For some, the experience of a 
business failure discourages further ventures into China and even into 
foreign countries altogether. Mister Johnson Lee who runs a distribution firm 
for European consumer goods lost a lot of money when his joint venture in 
China went broke after three years: “China too big of a game… difficult to 
manage from a distance” (interview 2003). And Mister Yap took his plastics 
manufacturing firm to China only to find his Chinese partners squeeze him 
out of a promising business deal in the Middle East (interview 2002). Others 
regard a failure more as an asset than a drawback and use their experience 
to direct business ventures into new areas that prove to be more successful. 
Henry Chan down-scaled his involvement in the Shanghai joint venture as 
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 he ran into problems with the Chinese bureaucracy – without pulling out of 
China completely. He understands that business opportunities are still huge, 
but as they fail to materialize, the venturesome spirit of this young dotcom 
entrepreneur ventures into new fields. With the global market on his mind, 
he enters transnational business space in a transnational partnership – 
located in Malaysia. Throughout the interviews, Malaysia emerges as the 
refuge of many Singaporeans who encountered problems in China. Mr. Joy, 
a Singaporean fashion wholesaler, lost much money when a Hong Kong 
partner went bankrupt due to failing investments in China mainland in the 
early 1990s. Ever since Mr. Joy declined repeated offers to enter China 
again: “Too big of a game, difficult to manage from a distance,” was his brief 
diagnosis of the Chinese market. Instead, he expanded business in 
Malaysia, because it is “closer and similar in terms of culture” meaning that 
the formal contracts he established with partners in Malaysia – all personal 
friends of his -  were respected and implemented to the letter. Frequently, 
Malaysian contract law, based on the British legal system that survived de-
colonization in many former British colonies, is memorized as an important 
advantage and, at the same time, binding factor for doing business in 
countries with a common British colonial past. 
 
On the other hand, Malaysia is not a comfort zone for everybody. 
Some of my informants reflect on the strained political relations between 
Singapore and its larger neighbor which go back to the 1960s when 
Singapore was evicted from the Malaysian Union. “They still treat us like a 
colony”, complained a successful agrarian entrepreneur from Singapore 
who relocated his business from Malaysia to China many years ago. Others 
pull out of Malaysia in search for bigger markets or out of frustration with the 
economic policies that hinder ethnic Chinese progress or because they 
regard Malaysia as a backward country. Mister Wah, a furniture 
manufacturer with factories in both Singapore and Malaysia, confided that 
he turned to Thailand: “… good for smaller firms, not as risky.  You can 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 11                                                       
 
22
 invest small money, labor is cheaper than Malaysia.” (interview 2002). And, 
finally, there are many Singaporean businessmen who establish coalitions 
with counterparts in Hong Kong to smooth their way into China. Mr. Joe, a 
packing-material manufacturer who traded with China, refused to take his 
production there because he thought that business people from Hong Kong 
were much better equipped to invest in China: “Hong Kong understands 
China better than us. In China they say yes but do ‘no’… you can lose 
everything” (interview 2002).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The number of Singaporeans expanding their businesses to China 
has clearly increased since the 1990s. The new generation of Singapore 
entrepreneurs is attracted to China because they are looking for new 
markets, product diversification and low-cost production sites. To enter 
China in a risk-avoiding way, they establish co-operative ventures with 
private firms, state-owned companies and foreign MNCs based on mutual 
interest. Although these entrepreneurs may entertain affective linkages with 
ancestral villages and relatives in China mainland, these ties do not play a 
leading role in their business decisions. There is no doubt that business 
ventures into China are subject to capitalist reasoning. However, the 
capitalist orientation of the young generation of Singaporean businessmen 
may also explain why China is not the single best place for Singaporean 
Chinese to invest. From a macroeconomic perspective, it is a very 
promising market due to sheer numbers (of both potential consumers and 
labour), but the microeconomic perspective often teaches otherwise. China 
is difficult to penetrate, as the multi-layered state bureaucracy requires 
cautious handling. The internationally less experienced Singaporeans may 
not be well equipped to deal with the complexities of doing business in 
China. Ethnic ties may facilitate a smooth entrance into the country, but 
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 often seem to be part of the manifold obstacles that ethnic Chinese 
investors encounter in China and lead to failure. 
 
The second and third generation of ethnic Chinese - born, raised and 
educated in Singapore – are often not sufficiently aware of the changes that 
Singapore Chinese identity have undergone during the last forty years of 
nation building in the city-state. Their imagery of Chinese identity is 
characterized by two cardinal mistakes. First, they think that their personal 
resources establishing Chinese identity are identical with the resources of 
the older generation of Singapore Chinese. Second, they think that China 
mainland has remained the same as it was when their parents maintained 
connections with their place of birth or ancestral village. However, there is a 
gap of a few decades since the older generation was actually involved in 
China mainland. In the meantime, Singapore has developed into a modern 
nation state with a British colonial history and a multi-cultural present. 
Memories of a Chinese past have generated frozen images and 
stereotypical representations of China and Chinese identity in the 
Singaporean imagination. The idea of that looking Chinese, speaking the 
language and sharing ‘Asian values’ constitutes a sound basis for business 
success has turned out to be rather naive. Societal transformations in both 
China and Singapore render part of the social capital which Singaporeans 
presume to possess inadequate and redundant in the present situation of 
doing business in China mainland.  
 
These few examples illustrate that the Singapore government was 
over-optimistic to expect the Singapore economy transplanting itself to 
China mainland solving the problem of too tiny a home market with an 
‘external wing’ or even a ‘Singapore II’. Cultural affinity, speaking the 
language, understanding business practices and even obtaining 
government support turned out to be insufficient guarantee for lasting 
success. As Johnny Lim, a Singaporean iron and steel producer said: 
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 “China is very Chinese, by comparison Singapore is not Chinese at all” 
(interview 2003).  For Lim, the awareness of the cultural differences 
between both countries resulted in successful deals with Chinese partners. 
For others, the same awareness became the reason to pull out of China. 
“We do things different here in Singapore”, has been a much quoted 
statement in this context.  
 
Learning by experience that Singapore Chinese identity represents a 
disadvantage instead of an advantage in China, contributes to a changing 
attitude vis-à-vis the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, their closest neighbours. 
Many of those who delete China from their foreign venture planning (re-
)turn to Malaysia instead. The relationship between the Singaporean and 
Malaysian Chinese is ridden with problems that reflect the tense 
relationship between both nation states. However, Malaysia also represents 
a comfort zone to turn to in order to recover from business failures in China 
mainland and to reconsider business strategies for the future. Because of 
the close relationship comprising of a shared past and a separate present, 
of love and hatred, similarities and differences, acceptance and rejection, 
the social capital of both Singapore and Malaysian ethnic Chinese is well 
suited for joint business ventures. However, Malaysia seems to be only a 
temporary comfort zone. Once the wounds caused by an unfortunate China 
venture are healed, Malaysia turns out to figure only as a stepping stone to 
business start-ups in Europe and the United States. 
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 Notes: 
 
1. All names of companies and interviewees cited in this text are 
pseudonyms. The researchers involved in establishing the database agreed 
with the respondents not to reveal their and their firm’s identity. 
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